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Abstract
This article examines the potential for corporate social responsibility (CSR) and other soft law 
initiatives in generating change for blue-collar migrant workers in the Malaysian workplace. We 
explain the absence thus far of adequate protection for blue-collar migrant labour in formal law 
and corporate governance from a ‘path-dependence’ perspective and examine the potential of 
soft law options and government policies on labour migration as possible catalysts of change. The 
impact of the 1997 Asian fĳinancial crisis in creating new corporate governance rules and govern-
ment support for the development of CSR is discussed along with international initiatives, such 
as the United Nations Global Compact, whereby Malaysian companies have committed to play-
ing a positive role in creating favourable outcomes for labour and human rights. Avenues of 
development vis-à-vis CSR and other soft law mechanisms for blue-collar migrant workers are 
offfered. We conclude with a comment on the trajectory for CSR, soft law options and blue-collar 
migrant employee relations in Malaysia by highlighting the potential for hybrid labour regula-
tion, whereby soft law may be hardened through creative methods of interpretation by the courts.
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Introduction
The satisfactory recognition of the voice of labour rights in the Malaysian 
industrial relations landscape has thus far been a dismal failure (Syed Ahmad, 
1997) due to the tripartite nature of the industrial relations system, emascula-
tion of trade union power and the political economy of the country (Jomo and 
Todd, 1994). A study of the historical facts that silenced the labour movement 
in Malaysia (Sundra-Karean, 2012: Chapter 2) proves that there is strong rule-
driven path dependence (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999) in the prevailing passive 
voice of labour generally. The legal origins of Malaysian labour law may be 
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traced to the period of colonisation between 1786 and 1957 (Ibrahim and Joned, 
1995) when English legal concepts were transplanted throughout the colony, 
which became Malaya. Malaysia, being a member of the common law legal 
tradition would therefore be categorised under the Anglo-American liberal 
market model, which is generally seen as adopting a shareholder-centred cor-
porate governance system (La Porta et al., 1998). There is a body of current lit-
erature, which argues that common law systems tend to produce a certain 
system of labour law and corporate relations, wherein labour relations are 
typically voluntarist, private contracting is high, legislation is minimal and the 
courts play a signifĳicant role in solving disputes (Botero et al., 2004). While 
most of these features describe the Malaysian industrial relations system, we 
are of the opinion that the legal origin (that is, common law) alone cannot 
explain why Malaysian labour relations and its influence on corporate gover-
nance is the way it is.
We rely on the work of Ahlering and Deakin (2007) to demonstrate that 
‘path dependence’ plays the more important role in understanding the nature 
of Malaysian labour relations and in designing suitable outcomes for labour 
and capital. The added normative value of using the path dependence method-
ology is that by investigating the path dependence we can expose the contem-
porary inadequacies that need to be addressed. In the Malaysian context, 
although the country inherited the English common law system and the West-
minster parliamentary system, the constitutional arrangements that followed 
after Independence in 1957 reflects a strong authoritarian government founded 
upon a restriction of civil and political rights; mainly the curtailment of the 
freedoms of speech, association and assembly through legislation that was 
constitutionally immune from judicial review.1 A path dependence analysis 
involving a study of Malaysia’s legal and political arrangements reveals the 
legal origin of the nation, the historical impact factors, its evolving divergent 
institutional dynamics and the political economy that is so crucial in under-
standing the position labour occupies in a given society at a given time.
In a nutshell, while the colonial government controlled labour unions, 
which were made up of migrant workers from India, Sri Lanka and China, 
through restrictive laws passed in response to a fear of labour movements 
which pursued communist goals, the post-independence government had an 
economic agenda of rapid industrialisation, the attraction of foreign direct 
investment and growth based on a platform of afffĳirmative action policies 
favouring the majority Malay Muslim community, commonly referred to as the 
1 By virtue of Article 4(2) Federal Constitution of Malaysia. See PP v Ooi Kee Saik [1971] 2 M.L.J. 
108; Fan Yew Teng v PP [1975] 2 M.L.J. 235.
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‘Bumiputeras’.2 This development policy is largely still in force due to the fact 
that the same political party has been in power since independence and Malay-
sia has not experienced an alternative government. The constitutional and leg-
islative framework supporting these economic policies not only restrict the 
traditional civil liberties of speech, assembly and movement, but also restrict 
the freedom of religion. The authoritarian style of government has translated 
into authoritarian management of workplaces, where similar path dependent 
characteristics are seen in relation to restricting unionisation3 and enhancing 
managerial prerogatives, thus producing ‘rules’ that are management-centred 
(Syed Ahmad, 1997). In pursuit of the country’s economic policies and in capi-
talising upon the forces and consequences of globalisation and the free mar-
ket, a convenient large pool of docile labour from Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
and China became available in the form of unskilled migrant workers who 
were vulnerable, dependent, hardworking and compliant.
Given the weak institutional framework operating for the local labour force, 
it is hardly surprising that blue-collar (unskilled or semi-skilled) migrant work-
ers, who are the most vulnerable of workers, are marginalised even further and 
that the State is the lead actor in this marginalisation process as it is the 
main regulator. Out of 183 countries surveyed by Transparency International, 
Malaysia sits at an uncomfortable 60 with a score of 4.34 on the 2011 Corruption 
Perceptions Index, which measures perceptions of corruption in the public 
sector. Results over the last ten years show that Malaysia has been progres-
sively recording lower scores on the Corruption Perceptions Index, thus reveal-
ing a path dependent pattern of governance. This article provides an evaluation 
of whether, regardless of this path dependence, there are nonetheless, avenues 
for the betterment of the blue-collar migrant worker’s welfare and work expe-
rience, given that Malaysia has made numerous international commitments in 
this regard and therefore has a responsibility to deliver the required outcomes. 
In the absence of more signifĳicant legislative reform, it is important to frame 
responses and solutions within the country’s path dependent framework as 
one cannot ignore the political reality.
2 Article 153 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia confers a discretionary power on the Head 
of State to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak, whilst 
also safeguarding the legitimate interests of other communities.
3 See Assoc of Bank Offfĳicers Peninsula Malaysia v Mins of Labour & Ors [1989] 1 M.L.J. 30; Non-
Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturing Employees Union v Director General of Trade Union & 
Ors [1990] 2 I.L.R. 97.
4 With a score of 0 being most corrupt and a score of 10 being least corrupt.
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Migrant Labour Welfare — Whose Responsibility and What Are the Rules?
As discussed above, due to the path dependent institutional setting for labour 
in Malaysia, solutions need to be framed within the prevailing institutional 
setting and dynamics both nationally and in the region. It is interesting to note 
that all the sending countries of migrant workers consistently scored lower on 
the Corruption Perceptions Index when compared to Malaysia. As such, genu-
ine self-regulatory multi-lateral standards-setting agreements and Memoranda 
of Understanding (MOUs) between the sending countries and Malaysia 
become illusory. Who then is responsible for migrant labour welfare? The 
answer must be one of joint responsibility among all the actors involved and 
these not only involve the sending and receiving states, but also, more impor-
tantly, include the various business entities, agents and end-users of the ser-
vice provided by migrant workers. Therefore, certain ground rules in the form 
of principles relating to procedural and substantive fairness must apply to 
issues impacting upon migrant workers’ welfare as these issues qualify for pro-
tection as human rights.
A survey of the present system of apportionment of responsibility reveals a 
highly decentralised system involving offfĳicial work permits issued at the dis-
cretion of states and flimsy contracts drafted by untrained ‘agents’, both formal 
and informal based on market whims and social networks. There is little evi-
dence of credible state or corporate commitment to migrant labour welfare. 
Therefore, a fresh approach is needed to provide a fresh trajectory for migrant 
workers’ interests given that hitherto, rule-driven path dependence has 
resulted in a weakening of labour’s interests, the most vulnerable being migrant 
labour.
Although ‘external shocks’ (Schmidt and Spindler, 2002) like the 1997 Asian 
fĳinancial crisis and the recent global economic slowdown arising from various 
corporate collapses have the potential to generate new evolutionary paths 
within a legal system and have provided the impetus for corporate governance 
initiatives in order to make corporate boards more accountable, formal corpo-
rate governance initiatives in Malaysia have been shareholder-centred, rather 
than stakeholder-friendly (Liew, 2007). In the eyes of a corporation that 
employs migrant labour in the manufacturing or construction industry, for 
example, the worker is not recognised as a viable stakeholder because the rela-
tionship between them is one of economic imperialism and subjugated depen-
dence. This subjugation takes place through a concerted efffort in the form of 
MOUs, a myriad of contracts and immigration licences negotiated and har-
nessed among states and business entities.
Therefore, by and large, migrant workers in Malaysia are left alone to fend 
for themselves. They hardly have a voice in the negotiation process for the 
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initial terms and conditions within the employment contract, let alone during 
ongoing employment. Individual employment protection for all eligible5 
employees is found in the Employment Act 1955 (EA), which creates a mini-
mum floor of rights6 for the very narrow category of employees covered by the 
Act, of which migrant workers are certainly a part. Apart from the EA, certain 
provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (IRA)7 also impact upon the 
migrant worker. In excluding certain matters from union negotiation and col-
lective bargaining, Section 13(3) of the IRA implicitly legitimises certain mana-
gerial prerogatives. This position conforms to the legal origin theory of common 
law markets being more employer-oriented, thus endorsing managerial pre-
rogatives (Botero et al., 2004). For migrant workers, these include issues con-
cerning promotions, transfers, employment duties or tasks, termination, 
dismissal and reinstatement. Since union bargaining, where available, is not 
forthcoming on these matters, the unskilled migrant worker with language dif-
fĳiculties is left to bargain individually.
However, in the next parts of this article, we demonstrate that there are 
signs that external global shocks like the 1997 Asian fĳinancial crisis and 
some internal shocks like changes in the political landscape, which have cre-
ated an unprecedented stronger opposition in Parliament and greater electoral 
awareness have impacted upon the government and corporations, predomi-
nantly multi-national corporations (MNCs) and government-linked compa-
nies (GLCs), to produce outcomes that are geared towards socially responsible 
corporate behaviour. Where such initiatives involve employee welfare, the focus 
appears to be on keeping the Malaysian and expatriate white-collar workforce 
happy and engaged, rather than the blue-collar migrant workers. Nonetheless, 
the potential for change in migrant workers’ welfare from the CSR agenda can-
not be discounted and must be pursued and actively encouraged.
Therefore, we are of the view that, for Malaysia, initiatives for improved 
work experience and benefĳits for migrant workers are, in the short-term, more 
likely to come from the market, rather than the state. Given the tripartite 
nature of labour policy in the country, the state, however, plays a crucial role in 
driving a CSR agenda and may be more amenable to doing so given the soft law 
nature of corporate codes. This is because the tripartite nature of labour rela-
tions in Malaysia encourages ‘partnerships’ between employers and the gov-
ernment, thus allowing the government to ‘cajole’ corporate behaviour patterns 
and outcomes, which are seen to be voluntary and legally unenforceable. 
5 Generally local and migrant workers earning below RM 1,500.
6 Comprising wage payments, hours of work, holidays, leave periods, redundancy payments, 
etc.
7 The statute that regulates collective bargaining in Malaysia.
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We embark next on investigating the role of national labour policies that may 
facilitate a CSR agenda for migrant workers.
National Labour Policy as Catalyst of Change
As labour relations in Malaysia operate within a tripartite arrangement, involv-
ing the State, the Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC), which is the 
umbrella body representing all private sector unions and the Malaysian 
Employers’ Federation, which represents employers, the government plays an 
important role in modelling the quality of migrant workers’ welfare and 
engagement in society. Thus far, the mode of migrant labour regulation has 
largely been through soft law initiatives involving MOUs between sending and 
receiving states, which create obligations towards migrant workers that are 
not enforceable. The close partnership between government and business 
under the country’s industrialisation and foreign investment policies, as well 
as the country’s afffĳirmative action policy, which inter alia imposes business 
licence, company directorship and employment quotas in favour of the major-
ity Muslim ‘Bumiputera’ provide reasons for the government’s resistance to 
formal change that will alter power bases. Bebchuk and Roe (1999) identify 
interest group politics as a reason for producing systems that are governed by 
rule-driven path dependence. This is apparent in the Malaysian case.
As such, we are of the opinion that Malaysia, in the short term at least, will 
continue experimenting with soft law options. The Code of Conduct for Indus-
trial Harmony (the Code) initiated by the government and endorsed by the 
MTUC and the Malayan Council of Employer Organisations (which was the 
precursor organisation to the current Malaysian Employers’ Federation), was 
passed in 1975 to guide employers and employees on good industrial relations 
practices at a time when the workforce was predominantly comprised of 
Malaysian workers. These provisions on consultation, welfare, reorganisation 
and dismissals, which are still relevant, are applicable to migrant workers.
The Ministry of Human Resources introduced another major governmental 
initiative in the form of the National Action Plan for Employment (NAPE) 
2008–2010, which sought to implement the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda.8 One 
of NAPE’s key principles which is relevant to the present discussion is ‘partner-
ship and development with social partners and stakeholders’ wherein:
8 Available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/lang--en/index
.htm, accessed on 5 March 2012.
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For employment, efffective partnerships require the development of a favourable policy 
environment, as well as capacity building of the partners, particularly in the case of 
workers’ and employers’ organisations. This means strengthening employer and worker 
perspectives, through policies and strategies that enable employers’ and workers’ organi-
sations to participate more efffectively in the governance structures, such as to provide 
services which help enterprises become “learning organisations”. Above all, greater dia-
logue is required between the social partners and others concerned to create a greater 
awareness and commitment to the development of employment strategies through col-
lective efffort (emphasis added). (Malaysia, Ministry of Human Resources, 2008)
As NAPE is a fairly recent initiative, there has not been any evaluation on how 
these broad policy statements are being translated into best practices. Apart 
from ILO-inspired policy initiatives by the government, like the NAPE 2008–
2010 above, ‘external shocks’, such as the 1997 Asian fĳinancial crisis and the 
recent international corporate collapses, have impacted upon Malaysian cor-
porate governance. We move on in the next part of this article to analyse if and 
how the 1997 Asian fĳinancial crisis has created positive outcomes in CSR prac-
tices in Malaysian workplaces and how these may be extended to migrant 
workers.
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance Initiatives
It has been written of transplant countries, such as Malaysia, which inherited 
and sought to apply the English common law and the Westminster parliamen-
tary system, that legal change has been ‘lethargic and erratic’ in that there is a 
tendency for formal law to be irresponsive to the substantial socio-economic 
changes taking place in the country (Pistor et al., 2002). In terms of corporate 
governance, the ‘lethargy’ in formal law change is also heavily influenced by 
the deeply-entrenched common law market-driven and path dependent cul-
tural ethos of concentrated ownership corporate structure in Malaysia (Khoo, 
2003), which impedes power sharing or the allocation of control rights to oth-
ers, such as employees. Hence, while there may have been signifĳicant corpo-
rate law changes consequent upon the Asian fĳinancial crisis, the introduction 
of ‘stakeholder-related reforms’ is unlikely. Such reforms relate to the role of 
stakeholder-employees in corporate governance, especially the role to be 
played by employees or their representative organisations such as trade unions, 
in decision-making by companies.
The 1997 fĳinancial crisis revealed several severe weaknesses in the Malay-
sian corporate structure. Corporate abuse, capricious decision-making, absence 
of transparency, absence of minority shareholder protection, improper 
accounting and audit practices, lack of accountability and weak fĳinancial 
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management are only some of the contributing factors towards the crisis 
(Liew, 2007). Laws, regulations and rules were targeted with the principal aim 
of enhancing the regulatory framework of public listed companies. The statu-
tory bodies responsible for corporate regulation and reform in Malaysia are the 
Companies Commission of Malaysia and the Securities Commission of Malay-
sia. The High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (HLFC), 
established in 1998 under the auspices of the Securities Commission exten-
sively reviewed the Companies Act 1965 on: (a) provisions involving the duties, 
obligations, rights and liabilities of directors, company offfĳicers and controlling 
shareholders; (b) provisions pertaining to the adequacy of disclosures and con-
flicts of interest in transactions resulting in the waste of corporate assets; 
(c) measures taken to strengthen the quality of general meetings; (d) rights and 
remedies of shareholders; and (e) the development of efffective governance 
and enforcement mechanisms.
The HLFC Report on Corporate Governance 1999 resulted in the creation of 
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) in March 2000. The 
MCCG adopted the following defĳinition of ‘corporate governance’ recom-
mended by the HLFC:
Corporate governance is the process and structure used to direct and manage the busi-
ness and afffairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate 
accountability with the ultimate objective of realising long-term shareholder value, 
whilst taking into account the interests of other stakeholders (emphasis added) (Malay-
sia, Securities Commission, 1999).
The subsidiary position of ‘other stakeholders’ does not augur well for protec-
tion of labour rights, let alone those of migrant labour, as it has to compete 
with other agendas, such as environmentalists, consumers and others for its 
position on the CSR stage. Further, the MCCG draws upon the United King-
dom’s ‘comply or explain’ approach set out in the Hampel Committee Report 
(Liew, 2007). This involves the use of best practice prescriptions together with 
a rule requiring disclosure of the extent to which listed companies have com-
plied with the prescriptions and where they have not, the reasons. The MCCG 
was revised in 2007 and consists of three main parts being: Part 1, Principles of 
Corporate Governance; Part 2, Best Practices on Corporate Governance and 
Part 3, Principles and Best Practices for Other Corporate Participants. How-
ever, these corporate governance initiatives have been described as ‘an adapted 
Anglo-American System’ which is strongly shareholder-centred, with concen-
trated ownership structures (Liew, 2007); a description that fĳits the legal origin 
hypothesis for common law market governance. This is in spite of the fact that 
the defĳinition of corporate governance in the HLFC Report aims to promote 
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“long term shareholder value whilst taking into account the interests of other 
stakeholders.” None of the statements under the MCCG “Best Practices” men-
tion the interests of other stakeholders or allude to the fact that they will have 
any direct or indirect voice in the new corporate governance structures and 
processes. For example, although the MCCG contains a provision on ‘share-
holders’, whilst it is provided that boards should maintain efffective communi-
cations policies that enable both the board and management to communicate 
efffectively with its shareholders, stakeholders and the public, the duty to com-
municate on operations of the company and accommodate feedback, which is 
required to be factored into the company’s business decisions, is only applica-
ble to shareholders.
This policy statement, by the Securities Commission of Malaysia, empha-
sizes a communications policy that centres primarily on shareholders and it is 
shareholder feedback that is factored into the company’s business decisions. 
The MCCG does not envisage a corporate governance structure for Malaysia 
that includes stakeholders, such as employees within that communications 
process contributing towards governance in a meaningful way; not even where 
employee interests and welfare are in issue or at stake.
Further, on the recommendation of the HLFC, Section 132(1) of the Compa-
nies Act was amended in 2007. Previously, Section 132(1) required a director to 
act honestly and use reasonable diligence in the discharge of his duties. It is 
now provided that a director must act “bona fĳide in the best interests of the 
company.” The HLFC did not agree that the term ‘best interests of the com-
pany’ should be statutorily clarifĳied, as it believed that there should be flexibil-
ity in the system. There is a view that the legal notion that directors must act in 
good faith in the interests of the company, rather than the shareholders, means 
that boards are able to initiate stakeholder-centred partnerships with employ-
ees focusing on productivity and quality as a strategy towards longer-term 
shareholder value. (Deakin et al., 2002).
However, in the Malaysian context, the absence of statutory clarifĳication in 
this regard under Section 132(1) empowers the judiciary to exert signifĳicant 
control over what would amount to ‘best interests of the company’. Malaysian 
judges have a choice to either follow the orthodox approach, which takes a 
shareholder-centred view9 of ‘best interests of the company’, or adopt a more 
‘pluralistic’ approach (Wedderburn, 1985, 1993), which seeks to defĳine the ‘best 
interests of the company’ in a more holistic manner, taking into account the 
9 Parke v Daily News Ltd [1962] 2 All. E.R. 929; Heron International Ltd & Ors v Lord Grade, 
Associated Communications Corp plc [1983] B.C.L.C 244.
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interests of all stakeholders, including employees, both local and migrant.10 
The problem for a labour rights approach, however, is that the Malaysian Cor-
porate Law Reform Committee in its report made it clear that Malaysian com-
pany law was not going to be reformed along pluralistic lines and that the social 
obligations of a company should not be codifĳied in legislation, but should 
be dealt with under non-statutory guidelines (Companies Commission of 
Malaysia, 2008).
It is obvious therefore, that any reform of corporate governance practices in 
Malaysia requiring stakeholder-centred initiatives consequent upon the 1997 
Asian fĳinancial crisis will not be detectable through formal law. Although there 
was extensive legislative and regulatory reform of corporate governance in 
Malaysia, these did not develop any new corporate governance structures that 
involved stakeholder-employees. Formal law saw to it that corporate structure 
remained true to the Anglo-American model with its strong emphasis on 
maximising shareholder value. As far as Malaysian labour-capital and labour-
government relations are concerned, Bebchuk and Roe’s (1999) view on rent-
seekers11 rings true in that “as long as those who can block structural 
transformation do not bear the full costs of persistence, or do not capture the 
full benefĳits of an efffĳicient move, inefffĳicient structures that are already in place 
might persist”.
Further, Liew’s (2007) fĳinding that the Malaysian corporate governance sce-
nario fĳits the Shleifer and Vishny model where “concentrated ownership brings 
potential advantages; for instance the controlling/large shareholder has large 
monitoring incentives where a controlling shareholder can provide focused 
strategic direction and long term commitment,” supports rent seekers. This is 
because the national and business strategic agenda does not include the 
betterment of employee issues, let alone migrant employee issues as a formal 
corporate strategy. Liew (2007), in her investigative interview on the perspec-
tives of key leading fĳigures in Malaysian corporate governance post-Asian 
fĳinancial crisis, found that the reasons for the 1997 Asian fĳinancial crisis 
included manipulation of funds by controlling directors, lack of ethics, dishon-
esty, political nepotism, political patronage, cronyism and inefffective gover-
nance structures. It is therefore of no surprise that she concluded her study on 
a pessimistic note that:
10 Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates [1994] 1 B.C.L.C. 363; Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc 
[1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 14.
11 In the Malaysian context, these ‘rent-seekers’ include those corporate players who are in 
comfortable positions either as a result of the afffĳirmative action policy discussed above or those 
who support it.
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[T]he success of the new corporate governance rules and regulations with the aim of 
improving corporate governance practices in the country is ultimately dependent on 
the prospect of limiting the powers of Malaysian controlling owner-managers and 
bureaucrats’ influence on businesses. Although the recent promotion of corporate gov-
ernance did serve a purpose in increasing the awareness of corporate governance in 
the country, evidence gathered so far suggests that the recent corporate governance 
reforms do not seem to have adequate capacity to efffectively capture and resolve many 
of the underlying (political) issues in Malaysia (Liew, 2007).
Whilst it is not within the scope of this article to analyse these issues, it may be 
said the ‘underlying political issues’ that currently have an impact on the inad-
equate voice of labour rights in corporate governance flow from the rule-driven 
path dependence discussed above, which was instrumental in silencing the 
labour rights movement over the last century and continues to silence discus-
sion of the rights of migrant workers.
Where then do we go from here? Are there signs that despite this bleak state 
of afffairs, there is hope and scope for labour-related CSR initiatives to emerge 
and evolve in a way that may benefĳit migrant blue-collar workers in Malaysia?
Malaysia’s Spontaneous Corporate Social Responsibility Model and Hybrid 
Labour Regulation
Revolutionising formal corporate governance in accordance with the objec-
tives discussed above requires strong political will that, in the Malaysian con-
text, is obviously lacking at the present moment as there are no signs of 
legislative reform in this area. However, this does not necessarily mean that a 
Malaysian model of corporate governance may not be developed based on 
extra-legal initiatives, such as CSR.
Liew’s (2007) study revealed that there are cries for a Malaysia’s ‘own’ corpo-
rate governance model, as opposed to the current Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance, which is too strongly shareholder-centred. Liew 
reported calls for pluralism, a more caring society, transparent government 
and a business environment with social responsibility. This augurs well for a 
CSR-based labour agenda that includes issues impacting upon blue-collar 
migrant workers.
The idea of CSR in Malaysia is not entirely new, as Malaysian companies 
have long been involved in philanthropy. However, what is new about CSR in 
Malaysia is the systematic and structured approach towards its ‘revitalisation’, 
supported and packaged by the state and its agencies. The starting point can 
perhaps be traced to the HLFC Report of 1999, which provided an expansive 
defĳinition of corporate governance which emphasized, not only business 
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prosperity and corporate accountability in the short-term, but the importance 
of “realising long-term shareholder value whilst taking into account the 
interests of other stakeholders” (Malaysia Securities Commission, 1999). In 
2006, Bursa Malaysia (the Malaysian Bourse) released its Corporate Social 
Responsibility Framework (the Framework) as a guide for all public-listed 
companies, whereby public-listed companies are required to disclose in their 
annual reports, initiatives on CSR, which includes workplace corporate social 
responsibility.
Bursa Malaysia’s Corporate Social Responsibility Framework defĳines CSR as 
“open and transparent business practices that are based on ethical values and 
respect for the community, employees, the environment, shareholders and 
other stakeholders.” The Framework reiterates the voluntary nature of CSR: 
“companies are free to adopt what suits them.” The Framework focuses on four 
main areas for CSR practice: the environment, the community, the market-
place and the workplace. Under ‘workplace’, the Framework specifĳically 
addresses a ‘quality work environment’ and health and safety.
Additionally, in July 2005, the Putrajaya12 Committee on Government-
Linked Companies High Performance was launched. One of its initiatives was 
the Silver-Book, which contains a set of guidelines on how government-linked 
companies can contribute to society in a responsible manner and create 
positive impact for their businesses and for society. The Silver Book defĳines a 
‘contribution to society’ as an activity undertaken by a business where the pri-
mary objective is to benefĳit the society in which it operates or to benefĳit groups 
of individuals or communities within that society. The Silver Book reafffĳirms 
that ‘social contributions are generally voluntary’ and adds that contributions 
‘can be in the form of cash or kind’. The Silver Book lists seven core areas of 
contributions to society,13 which are modelled along the 10 Principles of the 
United Nations Global Compact.14 At present, there are 72 Malaysian partici-
pants who have signed on to the Global Compact Local Network, of which 
66 are companies.15
Apart from the government initiatives above, CSR in Malaysia is also pro-
moted by the relevant non-governmental organisations, consultants and ‘CSR 
Malaysia’, an organisation formed in 2006. However, in spite of all the hype 
12 Putrajaya is the administrative capital of Malaysia.
13 Being (1) human rights; (2) employee welfare; (3) customer service; (4) supplier partnership; 
(5) environmental protection; (6) community involvement; and (7) ethical business behaviour.
14 The United Nations Global Compact is an international policy initiative which bridges the 
gap between various United Nations treaties and declarations on human rights, labour standards 
etc. and business.
15 Available at: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/participants, accessed on 15 February 2012.
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surrounding CSR in Malaysia, the results of a 2007 survey conducted by Bursa 
Malaysia on awareness and understanding of CSR among the listed companies 
on the Kuala Lumpur Bourse were extremely disappointing. The survey 
revealed that listed companies showed poor understanding and lack of aware-
ness in incorporating CSR policies and disclosures in their daily business oper-
ations. A breakdown of the results showed that 11.5% of the companies were in 
the ‘poor’ category, while 28.5% were ‘below average’ and 27.5% in the ‘above 
average’ categories. Among companies in the leading category, 67% consisted 
of multinational corporations.16
However, one should be careful in consigning CSR as a transformatory agent 
for migrant workers to the rubbish heap. The success or failure of a concept 
such as CSR must be judged against the legal, cultural and political backdrop of 
the country concerned. In the context of the Malaysian labour and industrial 
relations system, the Introduction of this article illustrates the existence of a 
strongly employer-centred system in Malaysia. Against this backdrop, it is not 
possible, and indeed it is impractical to expect a quick shift in corporate atti-
tudes towards and treatment of migrant workers.
The introduction of CSR in Malaysia and the measure of its success or failure 
must be, in the short term at least, viewed from a diffferent perspective. Labour-
related CSR initiatives in Malaysia thus far can be said to be successful in tak-
ing small steps in the right direction because where they have been embraced 
by companies, their annual reports reveal that this has led to the development 
of more cooperative approaches to management, as opposed to a pure top-
down, command and control type of management, with little or no regard to 
employee voice. Other benefĳits include provision of health insurance, training, 
work-life balance programmes, etc. Although these initiatives may currently 
relate mainly to the local workforce, there is no reason why the government 
should not coax corporations to include migrant worker benefĳits, considering 
that the state confers annual CSR awards on companies.
Concluding Thoughts
We are hopeful that with greater awareness programmes and training initiated 
by CSR Asia and CSR Malaysia, CSR will fĳigure signifĳicantly in the corporate 
governance structure of Malaysian companies in the future. A development 
which may have signifĳicant impact upon business is the ISO 26000 ‘Guidance 
on Social Responsibility’, which was fĳinalised in October 2010.17 These focus 
16 Available at: http://www.csr-malaysia.org, accessed on 20 January 2009.
17 Available at: www.iso.org/sr, accessed on 15 May 2011.
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upon seven core principles, namely, organisational governance; human rights; 
labour practices; the environment; fair operating practices; consumer issues 
and community involvement and development. Although ISO 26000 appears 
as ‘guidance’ and compliance is voluntary, Malaysian companies fear that this 
“will not stop multinational companies and others to compel their branch 
operations in Malaysia to be in full compliance or risk the stoppage of 
operations.”18 This will be an important driver of change which could lead to 
stronger institutionalisation of CSR, including perhaps through formal law if, 
for example, as will be discussed below, courts recognise and give efffect to soft 
law ‘promises’. Employers, of course, heavily resist these winds of change ini-
tially with the argument that this will efffectively destroy Malaysia’s competi-
tive advantage in the global economy.19
Initiatives post-Asian fĳinancial crisis however, have already begun the pro-
cess of change in corporate governance thinking towards greater transparency, 
accountability and integrity in corporate management and governance and it 
is not a long haul from this to reforming corporate governance through a more 
inclusive type of governance, one which emphasizes the welfare of migrant 
workers. Where these initiatives have been translated into workplace policies, 
courts may treat them as implied terms within the contract of employment, 
thus making such policies indirectly enforceable where possible. Sundra-
Karean (2011) argues that a new avenue of construction of employment con-
tracts may be created through hybrid labour regulation whereby soft law 
measures, such as policies and codes, may be hardened where there is evidence 
of incorporation into the contract of employment. This is especially so for 
Malaysia, where the right to livelihood has been recognised as a fundamental 
human right,20 allowing principles of procedural and substantive fairness to be 
infused into the contract of employment (Sundra-Karean, 2011). As such, the 
category of implied terms may be widened where implications of fact are made 
based on corporate codes.
The ground is certainly ripe for more research to be done to measure and 
evaluate whether the various initiatives discussed here have the potential of 
creating a new evolutionary path for the experience of the migrant worker in 
Malaysia.
18 The New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), 22 September 2007.
19 Ibid.
20 By virtue of the cases of Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 1 M.L.J. 
261; Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan [1996] 1 M.L.J. 481; Rama Chandran R v The 
Industrial Court of Malaysia [1997] 1 AMR 433.
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